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This article lays out a novel theoretical conception of how we can analyse continuity and change 
in US foreign policy. Focusing on the US relationship with the Middle East, or West Asia, it 
places America's rise to power in the context of world history. It shows how the US has worked 
towards an imperium and deployed an imperial right over the long durée. It argues that the Trump 
administration has maintained this tradition, marking a considerable level of continuity in US 
foreign policy. However, by better understanding the role and impact of crises, it argued that 
analysts could be far more sensitive to the role of ideas and how reasons for action shape foreign 
policy. As a result, it is shown that the Trump administration adopts an America first policy-
paradigm that moves away from a focus on free trade imperialism and towards indirect rule 
through authoritarian strongmen. This was a direct result of the Global Financial Crisis opening 
a period of paradigm contestation within the United States, and generating perceptions of 
American decline. To support this argument, the article uses advanced computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software to unpack the discursive-ideological formation of Trump's 
populist appeals. It demonstrates how dominating the Middle East is perceived by the Trump 
administration as a pathway to stopping relative American decline and engaging in a geopolitical 
struggle with China and Iran.  
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The purpose of this article is to outline a theoretically informed but empirically rich 
understanding of continuity and change in US foreign policy towards West Asia, by 
positing a social constructivist theory of foreign policy. Starting with a parsimonious 
overview, the article combines World History literature and International Relations 
scholarship to demonstrate continuities within the US relationship with West Asia. This 
provides a diachronic account of the US rise to power and the construction of an 
imperium, whereby policy-makers have sought to control their external environment. As 
part of this imperial enterprise, the US adopted the newly coined geo-strategic term 
‘Middle East’ from the declining British Empire in the 1950s. However, policy-makers 
did not remove the residue of imperialism coaxed within the concept. Instead, they 
embraced its imperial heritage and the imperial right to shape the region towards their 
interests. Demonstrably, in the long durée of world history, the US rise to power was 
contingent on the ontological construction, and domination, of the Middle East. In praxis 
this operated firstly over decades of indirect rule, supported by regional authoritarians, 
and then, secondly, the informal modality of free trade at the turn of the twenty-first 
century.  
 
Having provided the outlining of an overarching arc of continuity, this article moves 
forward by adding layers of theoretical complexity. This shows how we can be sensitive 
to change within particular synchronic moments. Ultimately, this is the first of this paper’s 
main contributions, whereby the role of international crises is unpacked to reveal their 
impact on foreign policy continuity and change. Crises are moments of construction and 
contestation in the operation of policy-paradigms. In part, this draws on neo-
institutionalist literature, but moves this forward by positing the role of discursive-
ideological formations (DIF) that are sedimented in, and operated though, policy-
paradigms. The importance of DIFs is that they function through articulation; joining 
ideas, concepts and social learning into identifiable narratives. We can, therefore, see 
narratives as an accessible bridge between DIFs and their operation through policy-
paradigms. In times of crisis, therefore, the post-crisis narration is central to 
understanding contestation, variation and processes of change. 
 
Operationalising this constructivist approach, this paper’s second contribution is a 
concise narrative analysis of Candidate Trump’s DIF using Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Undertaking a forensic narrative analysis of 
a large corpus of candidate Trump’s speeches, whereby over three million words were 
coded by ‘eye-balling’ the data and then supplemented with a powerful mixed-model and 
text-mining functionality; identifying frequencies, patterns of articulation and 
collocations within the discourse. This analysis reveals a specific understanding of how 
crises can be operated for political gain, but also a narrative of American decline triggered 
by the Global Financial Crisis. The construction of America First as a policy-paradigm 
draws on a distinctive DIF, articulating a renewed growth of American power with the 
domination of the Middle East and its resources. This is absent any notion of democracy 
promotion or ‘resizing’ America’s commitment to the region. The America First 
paradigm is openly reliant on authoritarian strongmen to facilitate indirect rule and ensure 
the renewal of American ascendency while competing for regional domination against 




The Rise of an Imperium and the Reification of Continuity 
The long durée of world history reveals a macro movement that shapes the overall 
framework of this article. Namely, as the United States has grown in power, it has sought 
to shape its external environment (Davies 2013; Frankopan 2016, 215–342). The United 
States, as Richard Van Alstyne’s seminal work makes clear, was founded upon the idea 
of ‘an imperium – a dominion, state or sovereignty that would expand in population and 
territory, and increase in strength and power’ (1974, 1). Whilst its early commitment to a 
liberal character was unique, its drive for power was not. States have long sought to shape 
their external environments. This has been well documented since the Sumerian city-
states started the global system between 4000-3500 BCE (Buzan and Little 2000). As 
Thucydides established in the History of the Peloponnesian War, perceptions of rising 
and fall within great powers matters in the global political order; as indeed more recently 
neo-classical realists have made clear. As states grow in relative power, they seek to shape 
and control their external environments.  As they have declined, they have been less able 
to do so (see Rose 1998; Zakaria 1998). Not all, of course, have adopted a violent and 
predatory approach, succumbing to technologically enabled temptations and European 
levels of expansion, slavery and colonialism (Abu-Lughod. 1991; Halperin 2006).  
The United States exemplifies this trend. A period of territorial expansion throughout the 
nineteenth century was accompanied by an active and aggressive foreign policy (Brauer 
1984). Insightfully, as Zakaria explains, the ‘resounding victory in the Spanish-American 
War crystallized the perception of increasing American power … [and] America 
expanded dramatically in the years that followed’ (1998, 11). The desire to shape and 
control its external environment spread beyond the Americas in the early twentieth 
century and focused on preventing a hostile regional hegemony emerging in Eurasia. 
Indeed, rather than making the world safe for democracy, control of West Asia has meant 
facilitating long-term alliances with authoritarian states and justified by references to 
realpolitik. In practise, the long durée of world history reveals an evolutionary pattern of 
Western imperial behaviour towards West Asia, transferred from European powers to the 
US as it rose to great power status in the twentieth century.  
To justify the US imperium of West Asia, US policy-makers have needed to justify 
continued intervention and global leadership of this regional subsystem. Parsimoniously, 
this was done in two distinct steps. The first was to construct the Middle East as an 
ontological entity within the American sociological imagination. The second was to 
construct a modus operandi or set of rules for engaging this ontologically subjective 
reification.2 Notably, the etymological moment of reification for the Middle East as a 
concept is easy to trace. It is to briefly review this construction and its articulation with 
Empire that we now turn.   
The Ontological Construction of the Middle East 
The concept of the Middle East is new within the context of world history. It simply did 
not exist until the late decades of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. 
Indeed, some accounts place its emergence in the British India Office in the 1850s, in 
response to the growing expansionist rivalry between Britain and Russia (Beaumont, 
 
2 The term ontologically subjective is made in reference to a specific understanding of 
philosophical realism and social ontology as set out by John R. Searle (2007, 82–84). 
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Blake and Wagstaff, 2016: 1). Before this, there was a vague sense of ‘oriental 
civilisations’, itself emanating from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798.  Prior to 
the twentieth century, historical accounts from inside and outside the region referred to 
specific complex societies. Rather, the Middle East was developed as a new strategic 
concept by the British Empire. It was developed in an attempt to grapple with the so-
called ‘Eastern Question’, the near east being the role of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, 
and the far east looking at the rise of China and Japan. Without delving too deeply into 
the fascinating twists and turns of history, by 1900, British policymakers were referring 
to The Problem of the Middle East in the Foreign Office (Voll 2014, 437–43).  
The rationale for the term was set out by Alfred Thayer Mahan, who is often, albeit 
misleadingly, accredited with inventing the term.3 In brief, he sets out the need for British 
imperial rule over the ‘middle East’ by ‘keep[ing] the particular protective relations 
already established with minor local rulers’ (1902, 236). Controlling this new ontological 
entity was of paramount importance to Britain’s great power status, and a strategic prize 
to be vigorously protected. As Mahan made clear, the advantages of British power and 
control over the ‘middle East’ were not to be abandoned ‘except as the result of war’ 
(1902, 239). Here we can see the etymology of the concept taking shape, and the Middle 
East constructed as an ontologically subjective product of global imperial ambitions. 
Mahan had captured the manner in which Britain had conceived the term through a logic 
of imperial strategy and control; not as a description of the culture or peoples of the 
region. The Middle East, as Burgess and Constantinou outline, is ‘a space of colonial 
facilitation’, that can be ‘shrunk or expanded for different strategists at different periods, 
meaning that the region could include in its enlarged cartography also countries such as 
Greece, Somalia, Ethiopia and Pakistan’ (2013, 368).  
As Britain's relative power declined, the American century began, and the imperial baton 
was passed on. This set the stage for American interventions. The US had already 
established that accession to great power status was dependent on wedding control and 
access with a subsystem favourable to US interests. By 1947 the regions oil-producing 
states provided over half of the oil consumed by the US armed forces, and the CIA 
concluded that the region’s oil was ‘essential to the security of the United States’ (Hahn 
2005, 7). The region's oil was used to revitalise Western European economies, and as one 
US government report outlined at the time ‘without petroleum, the Marshall plan could 
not have functioned' (in Yergin 1991, 424). The region’s oil was facilitating an American 
led reshaping of the global political order and transforming the Eurasia continent. The US 
officially adopted the concept of the Middle East in 1958, even as the Department of State 
specified that it was ‘indefinable’ (Special 1958; Voll 2014). Far from being neutral, this 
ontologically subjective construction remained steeped in conceptual residual of 
European empire and power. It signified an adaptive subsystem to be controlled and 
shaped during America's rise to great power status.  
Imperial rule(s) for the Subsystem 
As influence over the West Asian subsystem transitioned from European powers to the 
United States in the 1950s, a level of what John Lewis Gaddis terms American 
‘hyperactivity’ was established (1997, 167). At first, with substantial commitments 
elsewhere, there was a suggestion of extending NATO into the new Middle East or 
 
3 It should be noted that Mahan was an American naval officer and historian.  
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establishing a similar regional entity. This was rejected, along with any notion of direct 
colonisation (Lewis Gaddis 1997, 168). Yet, cloaked within the reification of the Middle 
East is a logic of domination (Hassan 2013; Said 1994). Here, the work of philosopher 
James Tully is particularly insightful at capturing the continuous operating rules of this 
logic. Tully captures this succinctly in the notion of ‘the imperial right’;  
 
This is the right of [Western] states and their companies to trade freely in non-
[Western] societies and the duty to civilise non-European peoples, together with 
the duty of hospitality of non-[Western] peoples to open themselves to trade and 
civilisation. If indigenous peoples resist… and thus violate the international duty 
of hospitality, the imperial powers have the right and duty to impose coercively 
the conditions of trade, hospitality and civilisation … [these] serve to legitimate 
the coercive imposition and protection of the legal and political conditions of 
western imperialisation on the non-west (2008, 210). 
 
We can see the imperial right being applied to the Middle East through three modalities: 
colonization, indirect rule and informal rule. The first modality was colonization 
requiring the implantation of European settler colonies. The second, indirect rule, is based 
on ‘imperial powers establishing a small colonial administration or trading company to 
rule over a much larger indigenous population indirectly, by establishing a formal 
infrastructure of imperial law’ (Tully 2008, 211). Under this legal system, resistance is 
deemed illegal. In practice, as Mahan illustrated above, this relies on making unequal 
treaties and recognizing local rulers as quasi-sovereigns. The objective of this is to make 
sure that local elites are themselves dependent on imperial power, and willing to divide 
any internal opposition or resistance. This is the authoritarian strongman model of 
imperial control.  
 
The third form of imperialism, that of ‘informal or free trade imperialism’ however is 
‘one step beyond indirect rule’. It allows for self-rule but shapes self-determination 
through the informal hegemony requiring full access to resources, labour and markets to 
free trade (Tully 2008, 2012).  Indeed, this is strongly reminiscent of G.W. Bush’s 
Freedom Agenda, and its focus on a ‘competitive liberalization strategy’ designed to 
harness free trade agreements as a modality of economic statecraft (Hassan 2013; Zoellick 
2003). Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, this logic of domination has 
structured the construction of the Middle East as a strategic object to be controlled. It has 
provided a modality of great power imperialism and provided an arc of continuity within 
the US rise to power. It is an evolutionary pattern of continuity within the long durée of 
world history. Notably, however, understanding this arc of continuity does little to help 
us recognize contemporary changes of policy or variation within this arc. It is to this that 
we now turn. 
 
 
Crisis and Change in US Foreign Policy 
 
Evidently, there has been considerable variation in US policy towards the West Asian 
subsystem, which is not captured by reference to the long durée. Inter alia the US rise to 
power and the decline of European empires changed the dynamics of the relationships, 
spurn on as they were by the dramatic repercussions of two world wars. For some, war is 
central to understanding change in foreign policy. Indeed, Paul Kennedy (1988) illustrates 
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at some length how war in the Western context has shaped the influence of great powers 
of the world system, as have other first-generation ‘rise and fall’ realists such as Robert 
Gilpin (1981). The later going so far as to argue that ‘war historically has been the basic 
mechanism of systemic change … and always will be’ (1981, 209). Indeed, Bahgat 
Korany identifies the significant role wars have played shaping the ‘Middle East state 
system’ from the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 onwards (2011, 12). That wars produce 
systemic change is an important but insufficient explanation of foreign policy change. It 
operates at too high a level-of-analysis for our purposes. By necessity, foreign policy 
changes occur before wars happen; wars are a foreign policy decision, and therefore 
change in foreign policy precipitate wars. Wars are moments of punctuation that break 
evolutionary trajectories, but they are themselves a product of changing decisions by at 
least one state.  
 
More fruitfully, we can see wars as a particularly devastating type of international crises, 
but not the only type of international crises. Crises are, in neo-classical realist terms, 
‘shocks’ that change perspectives of relative power between states (Rose 1998). This 
certainly bridges some ground between realist and constructivist ontologies. However, 
crisis is a more fruitful concept for our minimal perspectivist, or ‘thin’ social 
constructivist, purposes. Etymologically, the term crisis is derived from medicine and 
drama. It signified a critical moment where an intensification of processes was needed to 
come to a resolution (Sztompka 1994, 34). This was reflected in Habermas’ medical 
analogy, where the crisis was the moment of decision over whether to intervene in a 
patient’s health in order to help them survive. As Habermas argues, ‘The crisis cannot be 
separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it’ (1975, 1). Crises are, to 
use John R. Searle’s lexicon, ‘observer-relative phenomenon’ that are socially 
constructed (Searle 1996). This is echoed by neo-institutionalists such as Colin Hay, 
whereby crises are, 
 
a fusion of subjective perceptions and objective considerations ...  ‘Crisis’… 
literally ‘to decide’- is a moment of decisive intervention, a moment of rupture 
and a moment of transformation (1996, 87).   
 
Crises consist of both ontologically objective and subjective factors; they are 
intersubjective social constructions that facilitate political change. Here we can see a 
theoretical catalyst for institutional, and therefore foreign policy, change taking shape; 
uniting trends in neo-intuitionalist thinking with those in International Relations 
scholarship. As Stephen D. Krasner has shown, crises are important because ‘new 
structures originate during periods of crisis’ (1984, 240). The long durée may reveal the 
birth of modalities and patterns of policy continuation, but a constructivist conception of 
crises allows us to understand social change whereby crises punctuate the evolutionary 
rhythms of history. This allows us to draw a basic analytical distinction between ‘periods 
of institutional creation and periods of institutional stasis’ (Krasner 1984, 240). 
Understanding the role crises play in punctuating the evolutionary trends in world history 
allows us to make specific claims about the progression and tempo of political time; 
whether they be in the form of wars, pandemics, or financial crisis. It is to this that we 
now turn, so it is unavoidable to take the reader for a few paragraphs into the somewhat 




Policy-Paradigms and Cybernetic Functions 
 
The role crises play in the transformation of policy-making, and institutional change has 
been particularly well developed within neo-institutionalist literature since its key insights 
were fused with Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Hall 
1993; Hay 2001). Kuhn outlined a social epistemology of the history of science. This 
formative work, challenging logical positivism, illustrated how science develops in a 
succession of enduring paradigms which are punctuated by periods of revolutions. Within 
revolutionary periods, the dominant paradigm is challenged and replaced. Subsequently, 
it is possible to distinguish a phase of ‘normal science’ in which a paradigm is ascendant 
and uncontested; providing an interpretive framework for ‘routine puzzle-solving’ and 
demarcating the boundaries and methods of scientific competence. However, an increased 
accumulation of ‘anomalies’ can challenge the prevailing paradigm. They produce a loss 
of confidence and create a period of ‘exceptional’ science, whereby over time some 
scientists reject the former paradigm’s constraints in search of answers not provided by 
the old paradigm. This builds a period in which competing approaches emerge until a 
consensus can be created and institutionalised — establishing a new phase of normal 
science under a dominant new paradigm (Kuhn 1962). 
 
Peter Hall demonstrates the application of this pattern of paradigmatic contestation in the 
policy-making arena. He argues that policy-paradigms function as interpretive 
frameworks whereby,  
 
policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used 
to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing … this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which 
policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely 
because so much is taken for granted and unnameable to scrutiny as a whole 
(1993, 279). 
 
Politicians and policy experts internalise policy-paradigms. They then act as a source of 
guidance for conducting and evaluating policies. The utility of this approach is that it 
provides a dialectic space for the intersubjective role of ideas in the construction of 
foreign policy. Ideas become central to the dynamic social construction of reality by 
helping to both reproduce continuity and spark change.  
 
In ordinary periods of policymaking, policy-paradigms function cybernetically. Like 
Steinbruner’s (1974) tennis player, policy-makers do not need to consciously make 
hundreds of mental calculations each time they make a decision. The summation of 
complicated calculations is already stored ready for performance. Intellectual labour has 
already been spent on constructing the policy-paradigm by articulating disparate concepts 
and perceptions together. However, in response to a crisis, a policy-paradigm needs to be 
defended through narration or allowed to die, whereby it will, over time, be surpassed by 
another policy-paradigm (see Figure One). The paradigms themselves are translated into 
policy narratives that coordinate action and are communicated to wider audiences. These 
provide the necessary feedback loops to complete the cybernetic action; whereby they 
can be held within a collective social intelligence and adapted through social learning. 
Crises act as moments of punctuation in the course of a policy paradigms functioning. 
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Crises open up periods of contestation so other paradigms can challenge the dominant 
policy-paradigm. This dynamic introduces considerable scope for miscalculation because 
policy-makers narrate crises by representing them and then responding to them. This 
creates a separation between the conditions that gave rise to the crisis and the response 
because the crisis narration need not be sophisticated or accurate in its understanding of 
the crisis context (Hay 2001, 204). 
 






Articulation and Discursive-Ideological Formations 
 
With crisis narration being separated from the conditions that gave rise to the crisis, it is 
clear that reality and narratives do not necessarily have to mirror one another. Indeed, as 
the term cybernetic entails, ‘decision-makers have limited information processing 
capabilities. Instead of objectively searching all information for the best outcome, 
decision-makers will select an alternative that is acceptable’ or ‘good enough’ (Simon 
1985). As Hall argues, there is so much there that is ‘taken for granted and unnameable 
to scrutiny as a whole’ (1993, 279). If Hall’s point is that it is possible to operate within 
a policy-paradigm and be unaware of its intellectual roots or overall structure, we should 
agree. We should not, however, accept the notion that policy-paradigms cannot be traced 
and unpacked. They are a product of complex social processes, and reliant on the 
intellectual labour of articulation. Thus, as Stuart Hall explains,  
 
‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate.  It carries that sense of 
language-ing, of expressing, etc. But we also speak of an ‘articulated’ lorry 
(truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) can, but need not 
necessarily, be connected to one another.  The two parts are connected to each 
other, but through a specific linkage that can be broken (1996, 141). 
 
To articulate, from the Latin ‘articulāre', means to divide (meats etc.) into single joints. 
An ‘articulation' refers to ‘a joint' and a ‘setting of bones'. Thus, to articulate is to generate 
 





















a moment of ‘fixity’. It is also a condition of creativity, whereby representations are 
chunked together, and cumulate into “network shaped” discursive-ideological formations. 
Discursive in the sense that they rely on systems of representation, and ideological to the 
extent that they produce ‘ideology effects’ born from the rule structure they seek to 
maintain. Such effects are ‘ideological’ to the extent that they pertain to ‘relations of 
domination/subordination … what makes some discourses ideological is their connection 
with systems of domination’ (Purvis and Hunt 1993, 497). Intellectual tribalism aside, the 
crucial point to note here is how this ‘operates systematically to reinforce and reproduce 
dominant social relations', or for our purposes, dominant modes of international relations 
(Purvis and Hunt 1993, 497). 
 
The importance of introducing discursive-ideological formations to our analysis is that 
they allow for historical contingency, and are expressed in and through narratives. They 
can draw on fashionable ideas of the time, and articulate them with ones as old as human 
history. They can give different weight and shape to the same ideas giving context and 
variation on praxis; creating a dancing landscape of both continuity and change. It is, 
therefore, entirely possible for the same behaviour or core set of principles to be enacted 
or justified in different ways. This allows policy-makers to coalesce around policy-
paradigms in broad or general agreement when nodes of meaning overlap. We do after 
all want to be ‘secure', ‘just' and ‘free', even if we fail to agree on the meaning of these 
essentially contested concepts. Discursive-ideological formations help us understand how 
successive US administrations within the long durée can maintain an imperial right over 
the construction of the Middle East, (a continuous strand of behaviour or node in the 
discourse) and operationalise different policy paradigms (with elements of variation) 
(Hassan 2013). Just as the pieces of a kaleidoscope can be shaken to form everchanging 
patterns and views, the pieces are still contained inside the instrument; binding boundless 
possibility.  
 
Methods: ‘Reactivating’ Discursive-Ideological Formations 
  
To understand policy-paradigms, it is necessary to unpack the discursive-ideological 
formations informing them. This implies a particular set of methods. Not only is there a 
need to understand the articulation of concepts, but also their meaning and relationship 
with the methodology we have outlined. To assist in this, a corpus of candidate/President 
Trump’s speeches was coded in the CAQDAS PROSuite. This was coded by “eyeballing” 
the data in QDAminer, in addition to subjecting the data to advanced content analysis and 
text-mining protocols in WordStat. This was designed to service the complex Husserlian 
objective of ‘reactivating’ the discursive-ideological formation sedimented into and 
reified by, the Trump administration’s policy-paradigm. The account that follows is a 
distilled summation of those findings, which has systematically analysed a corpus of 
3,114,973 words in total. This total includes over one-thousand transcriptions of 
campaign speeches and early Presidential speeches dating from 2015 through to 2017.5 
This represents as complete a corpus as of public speeches as possible for this time period, 
compiled from news sources such as CNN and the New York Times, along with 
transcriptions of video content made by the researcher. Importantly, this time period was 
selected as it represented a crucial and formative period of the DIF before it was 
institutionalised into governance and disseminated as a wider policy-paradigm through 
 
5 The campaign and Presidential documents were separated, so they could be analysed together 
and separately.  
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the apparatus of state. These methods made full use of advanced content analysis 
functions and the ability to visually represent data as a guide to the analysis. Given our 
focus on articulation, patterns and frequencies of co-occurrence were identified and 
turned into data visualizations to better engage with the data. These served as a proxy 
representation of the weight given to concepts within the DIF, and an indicator of meaning 
via collocational structuring. That is to say, how concepts are structured by the company 
they keep and articulated together to provide fixity. Instructively, this article accepts the 
long held hermeneutic notion that to understand the meanings of words in context, we 
should accept the simple premise that ‘words meanings can best be investigated through 
the analysis of repeated linguistic patterns in corpora’ (Brezina, 2018: 66). Herein, we 
can see in Figure Two a visualisation of the corpus data and embedded discursive 
relationships. This tells us, both the proximity of frequently used words in relation to one 
another, and the proportional usage of the words in the corpus. Through a forensic 
analysis it is possible to discern how concepts are articulated together to provide meaning, 
showing that DIFs are not arbitrary nor random, but emerge in and through repeated 
articulations. Moving forward, this is useful because it not only provides empirical 
evidence for the argument presented, but allows us to visually represents the pattern that 
emerges from over three million words and two and a half years of statements. It is against 
this background that the remainder of this article should be read. 
 
 
Figure Two: Concept Map of Candidate Trump Corpus demonstrating Proximity 










The Global Financial Crisis, Trump and the West Asian Subsystem: The Return of 
Great power Rivalry 
 
Discernibly, crises have played a significant role in shaping the US relationship with West 
Asia since the 1950s. From the Suez Crisis to the War on Terror, there have been notable 
moments of punctuated evolution shaping the relationship. Nonetheless, as a wider 
number of seminal studies have explained, it was the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, that 
set-in motion the conditions of policy-paradigm contestation within the US political 
system and the wider international system (Altman 2009; Kirshner, 2014; Tooze, 2018). 
The latent effect of this on West Asia, as a nested subsystem within the larger 
international system, was to attract renewed great power rivalry in the region. Indeed, 
following the financial crisis, China abandoned its 1955 policy of noninterference and 
sought to challenge American domination of West Asia. Over the last decade, China has 
increasingly sought to construct a non-US aligned block in a balance of power against US 
allies within West Asia. Iran is particularly important given its geographical location for 
the Belt and Road Initiative (Lyall 2019; MFAPRC 2013; Sun 2019; Yahya 2019). Also, 
since 2011, there has been renewed activism from Russia in the subsystem, most 
demonstrable in Syria but also throughout the Shia Crescent. This has contributed to 
tensions between powers competing to secure their professed interests. They have also 
fermented perceptions of relative decline in US power following the financial crisis. We 
can see this shift in the contrast between the unbound period of G.W. Bush’s Freedom 
Agenda to remake the Middle East, through to Obama’s ‘resizing’ or ‘pivot’ following 
the economic crisis (Hassan 2013; Lynch 2015). The Obama administration was 
attempting to reduce the costs of an overextended foreign policy in the region, even as 
this period of great power rivalry emerged. It is precisely perceptions of systemic US 
decline, however, that made the political impact of the global financial crisis so acute. It 
opened a period of exceptional policy-making, whereby new policy-paradigms were able 
to emerge and compete for dominance within the American political system. Trump’s 
‘America First’ has proved to be the primary competing paradigm; opening a period of 
considerable paradigm contestation.  
 
The Trump Campaign and the Production of Crisis 
 
That the Financial Crisis created a moment of punctuation and subsequent policy-
paradigm contestation is evident by taking a closer look at President Trump’s presidential 
campaign corpus. This formative period provides a considerably transparent 
demonstration of the paradigm’s emergence; “America First” did not emerge from 
nowhere, it was constructed in response to the crisis and communicated over time through 
the political process.6 Initially its underpinning DIF was explicitly articulated by Steve 
Bannon as a political and strategic response to, in his terms, “The Crisis” (Bannon 2010). 
Indeed, his 2010 documentary Generation Zero caricatures the Global Financial Crisis to 
justify the production of a deliberate “crisis strategy” following a “financial 
 
6 Significantly, we can see this period as constructive, but as Complexity theory suggests we 
need to consider lag occurring within any complex adaptive system. This is consistent with 
Kuhn’s theory and institutional theory more widely. Just as switching on the thermostat does 
not make a room instantly warm, paradigms take time to be constructed while they challenge 
dominant paradigms. As such, the time discrepancy between the crash and Trump’s success 
is itself an indicator of paradigm contention rather than a challenge to the theory being 
presented. 
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Armageddon” that challenged America’s place in the world. Through a dystopian 
narrative, Bannon and many conservatives that would become central to the Trump 
administration, set out how the US is undergoing a “cultural crisis”. A “crisis of trust” 
has set in motion a “crisis war”. In response “populism” is needed to return “moral 
hazard” to the financial system in a “crisis era”. The power of government, it was argued, 
needs to be restored to “the people” and the “forgotten man” (Bannon 2010).7   
 
Notably, the term ‘people’ is constructed in a nativist manner within the post-crisis 
narrative. This is strongly identifiable within the Trump campaign corpus, where it 
emerges as the dominant node from which much of the DIF is articulated and built upon 
(see Figures Two and Three). Not only is it the most frequently used keyword, but its 
meaning was shaped by the way it was used to construct simplified identities and roles 
within the post-crisis narrative.8 There were “American People”, “our people”, “their 
people”, “smart people”, “stupid people”, “good people”, “the right people”, “angry 
people” and most commonly “a lot of people”. The usage was not only designed to 
construct a ‘good’ inside and a ‘dangerous’ or ‘bad’ outside, but also to juxtapose those 
‘stupid people’ responsible for the crisis and the ‘dangers’ of an American (often racially 
loaded) under-class. This method of demarcation is central to populism and tribal politics.  
 




7 “Forgotten man” is used 23 times within the corpus, and of particular note is how candidate 
Trump notes that ‘We call them the forgotten man" — demonstrating collective social effort 
in the DIF construction.   
8 The term people is disproportionately used 22953 times within the Corpus. The TF-IDF 
weight is 502.5. Standing for ‘term frequency–inverse document frequency’ this statistic 
provides a weight for the importance of terms within the corpus. The algorithm measures the 
importance of a term by working out term frequency rather than simply counting the usage 




Repeatedly evident within the corpus is how traditional American elites were juxtaposed 
with Trump and Trump’s representation of the American people. Central to the identity 
constructions, however, were articulations made between the concepts people and money. 
The later concept operated as a delineator. Trump was self-characterised as financially 
independent, whereas both the Republican and Democrat elite were dependent on 
financial contributions and detached from the people. The articulation of people and 
money also helped to shape understandings of broader social and international 
relationships and creates a transactional approach to social relationships. Gone were 
notions of American international leadership, replaced by a focus on quid pro quo: 
 
If Germany and the PEOPLE and the folks from Europe aren't going to take a 
more active role -- why are we leading every charge, whether it's Ukraine or 
whether -- I mean everything we do, Iraq, who's taking there -- you know, we 
spent all of that MONEY. 
 
The importance of this consistent and repeated articulation is its ability to delineate 
identities within a populist framework that is explicitly tied to the causes and 
consequences of the financial crisis.9 The articulation prescribes who to blame and what 
to do next. It facilitates the construction of a dystopian narrative where “a rigged 
system”10 is allowing the outside-in, facilitated by “globalists” and “immigrants” at the 
expense of the American worker and American power.11  With Trump cast as the saviour 
in a time of crisis, he self-professed that ‘Wow, the economy is really bad! ... and getting 
worse … Only I can fix’ (Trump, 2015). Accordingly, we should not see the DIF as 
arbitrary. It has been constructed by ‘a group of radical conservative thinkers’, many of 
whom would go on to be inside the Trump administration, such as ‘[Michael] Anton, 
Sebastian Gorka, Stephen Miller, and Julia Hahn’ (Hell and Steinmetz 2017, 388). They 
have sought to leverage socio-economic anxiety and fear to narrate a crisis in US 
hegemony, and a generate a ‘populist’ response what they have constructed as a time of 
exception. It is this dystopian narrative of American decline that is at the core of the 
“America First” paradigm. 
 
Narrating Dystopia and Decline 
 
The Trump campaign’s narration of crisis and American decline was particularly 
pronounced within the data. Indeed, immediately after declaring his candidacy, Trump 
set out his platform to address American decline through a series of rhetorical questions:   
 
When was the last time the U.S. won at anything? When was the last time we beat 
China or Japan in trade? Or Mexico at the border? Or anybody in negotiation? 
When was the last time we had a military victory that was so complete and total 
that the other side just said "We Quit!" It just doesn't happen for the U.S. anymore. 
 
9 Money and People co-occur within the corpus 1003 times. 
10 Rigged and System co-occur within the corpus 339 times 
11 The term ‘globalist’ is used four times within the corpus and is defined by Trump as ‘You 
know what globalists are? Who want to the strip the jobs and the wealth from our country 
and give them to every other country.’ The first usage was from Alex Jones, and Trump's 
trialling of the term was unsuccessful, yet tropes associated with it were frequent. Jobs for 
example are referred to 3284 times.  The term immigrant was used 233 times. 
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This was not simply nostalgia. It was a rhetorical device to allow the Trump campaign to 
narrate America’s declining global position. For Candidate Trump, 
 
the world is becoming far more dangerous every day. Iran is racing towards 
developing nuclear weapons. China is exponentially expanding its military power, 
ISIS is beheading Christians simply for being Christian. In Benghazi, Islamic 
terrorists killed our diplomats without any consequences. Iran and ISIS, 
separately, are taking over vast areas in the Middle East and with it the largest oil 
reserves in the world. 
 
This narrative skilfully tapped into long-held conservative fears, which had been slowly 
encroaching into the mainstream Republican Party. The financial crisis brought them to 
the foreground, bridged as they were with the rise of the Tea Party movement (Patenaude 
2019). Candidate Trump’s crisis narrative was premised on his victory delivering a 
‘comeback’, and the return of jobs, prosperity, and a rising America; captured in the 
campaign slogan Make America Great Again.12 As Figure Four demonstrates, this 
campaign slogan was by far the most used phrase in the campaign. However, it was 
reinforced with other significant tropes of ascendancy throughout the campaign such as 
‘make America safe again’13; ‘make America strong again’14; ‘make America wealthy 
again’15; and ‘bring back our jobs’16 (see Figure Four).  
 
The importance of this myth creation should not be underestimated. Indeed, rather than 
the realities of socio-economic factors being a good predictor of Trump voter behaviour, 
many notable studies have shown that a ‘sense of decline’, ‘status threat’, and ‘White 
nostalgic deprivation’, are better predictors of voter behaviour (Blum and Parker 2019; 
Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018). Trump's crisis narrative was particularly fecund at tapping 
into pessimistic anxiety of decline and promising a return of US hegemony. This is a 
fundamental part of the DIF, underpinning the Trump administration’s policy-paradigm. 
As Trump made clear in his inaugural speech, ‘This American carnage stops right here 













12 The TF-IDF weight for Make America Great Again is 242.2, with 700 occurrences within the 
corpus.  
13 TF-IDF weight 119.8, with 142 occurrences. 
14 TF-IDF weight 105.8, with 115 occurrences. 
15 TF-IDF weight 101.2, with 100 occurrences. 
16 TF-IDF weight 116.2 with 110 occurrences. 
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Figure Four: Distribution Frequency of Software Identified Phrases in Candidate 




Trump, America First and the Imperial Right: "Where's my favourite dictator?" 
 
Pertinent to our analysis here, is how the America First paradigm, and its articulated 
construction of American decline, shapes the Trump administration’s engagement with 
West Asia. The visible importance of West Asia within the DIF is evident in Figure Three; 
where terms such as ISIS, IRAQ, IRAN, OIL and ISRAEL appear in high frequency; in 
addition to being an important coded subset of the terms ENERGY, SECURITY, and 
NUCLEAR during the ‘eyeballing’ process. Simply put, the data shows us that 
prescriptions of American decline were consistently articulate with an imperial right over 
the Middle East. The data shows us that the DIF constructed the context in-and-through 
which President Trump’s subsequent conduct can be understood. Whereas a long lineage 
of scholars, such as James Barber (2016 [1972]), have asserted a Presidential worldview 
based on a range of psychological factors, this analysis shows that an approximation of 
this can be discerned in an DIF and understood through a forensic analysis of the 
narrative; a crucial difference being the methodological shift from phenomenology to 
hermeneutics. It is because of this, that we can understand narrations of American decline 
(describing what has happened) prescribing a set of actions (what should happen in 
response) coalesced around the slogan ‘Make America Great Again’. This is crucial to 
understanding the nexus between the data presented in this article and its overall 
argument. It had been argued of candidate Trump, that ‘the press takes him literally, but 
not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally’ (Zito 2016). Contrary to 
both, a forensic analysis of the DIF demonstrates, that during the campaign he was both 
serious and literal. It is this that helps us to understand how Trump’s promise of renewed 
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American power was predicated on the imperial right over the Middle East; showing 
remarkable continuity with world history even if there is, as Edward Elgar would say, a 
variation on an original theme.  
 
To demonstrate the relationship outlined above, between DIF, paradigm, context and 
conduct, it is important to illustrate a clear example. The simplest of these is with 
candidate Trump’s repeated assertions about securing access to the region’s oil wealth. 
Throughout the campaign, Trump frequently asserted America’s right to ‘take the oil’, 
demonstrating a desire for an imperium par excellence.17 Within candidate Trump’s 
corpus, this was not only articulated as a modality of counter-terrorism, cutting off a 
source of income for ISIS, but also a way of competing with Iran and China. As President, 
this has been a driving factor of Trump’s Foreign policy in the region. For example, 
contrary to his own advisers, President Trump has repeatedly asserted the right to control 
Syrian oil. President Trump has used this articulation to rationalise a continued American 
troop presence:  
 
We’ve secured the oil, and, therefore, a small number of U.S. troops will remain 
in the area where they have the oil.  And we’re going to be protecting it, and we’ll 
be deciding what we’re going to do with it in the future (Trump 2019). 
 
Similarly, during the campaign, Iran was classified as a threat because it was trying to 
‘destabilise the Middle East’ through ‘sponsoring terrorism’ while on the ‘path to nuclear 
weapons’. These tropes were often articulated by reference to the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) as ‘the worst deal ever’.18 For candidate Trump, the JCPOA was 
highly representative of American weakness and relative decline. This laid the discursive 
tracks for the America First paradigm to legitimate the Trump administration 
withdrawing from the JCPOA in May 2018. This was combined with the imposition of 
sanctions, and a focus on Iranian oil exports; as oil was perceived to be central in the 
geopolitical power struggle over the region and the assertion of an imperial right. 
 
Challenging Iran and China is central to the America First paradigm, as these powers 
contest the construction of an imperial right over the Middle East. For Trump, their 
relative ascendancy also symbolises America’s relative decline. However, confronting 
the challenge to regional and great power involvement is problematic. Trump’s dystopia 
sets out a vision of American offensive weakness exposed by the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. A central element in the formation of the America First paradigm is the shadow 
of the Iraq war and the lessons being interpreted from it. It illustrates the high costs in 
blood and treasure. The wars also demonstrate the failures of the traditional political elites 
and their role in ‘totally destabilising the Middle East’; outlining the risks of regime 
change. This articulates a vivid hyperbolic discourse. One that is capable of writing out 
the importance of the 2010 and 2011 revolutions within the subsystem. The revolutions 
were not narrated as a result of Arab agency, or rejection of authoritarianism, but 
articulated ‘regime change’ and American weakness: 
 
 
17 Within Candidate Trump's Corpus, ‘take', and ‘oil' co-occur on 191 occasions out of the 393 
times the term oil is used.  
18 Within Candidate Trump's Corpus, this term appears on 202 occasions, concerning the 
JCPOA, but also towards Free Trade Agreements such as NAFTA.   
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Her [Clinton] push for regime change in Libya, Egypt and Syria has been a total 
and complete disaster. Her Iraq policy has been catastrophic. She's unleashed 
ISIS across the Middle East with her bad decisions and her bad judgment … she's 
a weak, weak person. She doesn't have the strength … Syria and Libya 
committing unspeakable inhuman atrocities and trying to launch attacks against 
the West. Iran meanwhile has been placed on the path to nuclear weapons, has 
become a true power. They've become a true power in the Middle East and 
beyond. 
 
Within the America First paradigm, there is a tension between firstly, the imperial right’s 
push for control and American ascendency; secondly, renewed regional and international 
competition within the subsystem; and thirdly, America’s unwillingness to act because of 
a perception of weakness and exposure to risk. These tensions not only define the Trump 
administration’s goals and reasons for action, but also the instruments it is willing to 
utilise in their attainment.  
 
We can see the impact of these underlying dynamics reified in Trump's approach to 
securing the imperial right. With history repeating itself, the Trump administration’s first 
policy consideration was to construct an ‘Arab NATO' (Detsch 2019). Echoing the 1950s, 
this was to somehow institutionalise America hegemony by bringing the Gulf powers 
together to balance against Iran and Chinese interventions. This was the America First 
paradigm trying to enact the imperial right within the parameters of a limited US 
commitment. Doomed to failure, the Trump administration all but abandoned this 
approach and embraced the indirect rule aspects of the imperial right. This is a logical 
corollary of the DIF. Appeals to ‘informal or free trade imperialism’ are not viable within 
the America First paradigm because of its rejection of globalisation and understanding of 
the financial crisis. If the Middle East is to be an object of domination, this is to be done 
by relying on strongmen for indirect rule, not the informal mechanisms of free markets. 
Whereas President’s Bush and Obama relied on promoting free market mechanisms in 
the hope of creating modernisation, interdependence, and democracies leaning towards 
US interests, there is no avenue with in Trump’s DIF for this approach to be enacted 
within the America first paradigm (Hassan 2018). Herein, we can understand Trump’s 
abandonment of any sentiments towards democracy promotion or ‘resizing’. Just as 
Trump set out on the campaign trail, as President, the America First paradigm favours an 
unbridled embrace of the region’s authoritarians willing to support the imperial right for 
their own regime survival and a renewed American ascendency. This has allowed the 
House of Saud to act with impunity as long as it aligns with American interests; most 
spectacularly evident in the murder of the Saudi dissident and Washington Post columnist 
Jamal Khashoggi. This is mirrored in Egypt. As Trump would ask of Egyptian strongman 
Abdel Fattah El-Sisi “where’s my favourite dictator?” (Youssef, Salama, and Bender 
2019) The utility of indirect authoritarian rule outstrips the Islamophobia articulated 
within the DIF (see Eroukhmanoff 2018).  Expressions that ‘Islam hates us’ are 
overlooked beyond the sea's edge, in favour of the imperial right and the renewed 
imperium of the United States. But of course, whilst Trump may have a different 
paradigm to previous presidents, his DIF shares the same appeal to an imperial right over 
the Middle East. The America First paradigm arose to contest globalisation and 
perceptions of American decline, but the data shows it has not abandoned the imperial 





The article has sought to understand how the Trump foreign policy fits within the long 
durée of the US relationship with West Asia. To do this, it has sought to fuse and advance 
existing debates within constructivism and neo-institutionalism, and apply them to the 
analysis of foreign policy (Barnett 1999; Hassan 2012; Hay 2006; Kubalkova 2001; Onuf 
1998). Ultimately, this has allowed us to distinguish between the shape of continuity and 
change in international politics, through the rise and fall of fall of states and moments of 
crisis and paradigm contestation. Yet, it is in articulations of DIFs, and the narratives this 
gives rise to, that show us the content of continuity and change of state’s foreign policy. 
Herein we can see how Trump’s approach to West Asia fits within a broader 
understanding of history, even if the America first paradigm is distinctive. Our analysis 
of President Trump’s DIF reveals that the imperial right continues to be a loadstar of US 
foreign policy in West Asia. It remains a continuous discursive node bridging the long 
durée with contemporary global politics. This is not coincidental. It is a direct product of 
American policy-makers perceiving the rise of their imperium as tied to the geostrategic 
orientation and control of the Middle East. We can see the strength of this continuity, as 
our diachronic account of world history resonates with our synchronic analysis of the 
Trump administration.  
 
Through the added-value of our theoretically driven constructivist approach, we can see 
variation and contestation within this account generated by the global financial crisis. 
Trump is a post-crisis president. President’s G.W. Bush and Obama favoured the informal 
mechanisms of free markets. Obama went so far as to allow the collapse of authoritarian 
allies in Tunisia and Egypt in 2010-2011 and attempted to resize American involvement 
in the region. Trump’s ‘America First paradigm’ rejects this ‘free market paradigm’, in 
what is a continuing ‘exceptional’ period of policy-paradigm contestation. America First 
rejects free-market integration that is not heavily favourable to the ascendency of the US, 
as a direct result of the financial crisis. It rejects ‘globalists' and ‘globalisation' as these 
are seen as contributing to America's relative decline. In the same vein, it also rejects 
allowing relative gains by those unfavourable to the US imperium or multilateral 
compromise in what is constructed as zero-sum games. As a result, it is a policy-paradigm 
that is directly confrontational with Iran and China. Conversely, it is also a paradigm that 
focuses on American weakness and the avoidance of military risk. This is a unique 
formation in post-war US foreign policy, whereby if it were to emerge as the paradigm 
of consensus, it would have a significant impact on the character of the global political 
order. If it was to be more deeply institutionalised within US foreign policy, then we 
should expect consolidations of authoritarianism under a populist banner. We can see this 
taking shape in West Asia, whereby America First is translated into unconditional support 
for authoritarian regimes, provided they renew American power and help ‘Make America 
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